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Terrorists	thrive	on	media	coverage	because	it	multiplies	the	effect	of	an	attack	
(Nacos,	2007).	However,	according	to	the	Global	Terrorism	Database	(GTD),	only	ten	
percent	of	terrorist	attacks	have	been	attributed	globally	from	1970	to	2017	(START,	
2017).	If	the	media	coverage	is	a	prerequisite	for	a	terrorist	group’s	survival,	the	lack	of	
attributed	attacks	in	the	world	is	puzzling.	This	thesis	examines	the	phenomenon	of	
unattributed	terrorist	attacks	using	Pakistan	as	a	case	study.	Pakistan	is	used	as	a	case	
study	because	the	percentage	of	claimed	terrorist	attacks	in	Pakistan	closely	resembles	the	
global	average	of	the	lack	of	attribution	of	terrorist	attacks	–	only	fifteen	percent	of	attacks	
are	attributed	in	Pakistan.	By	using	different	organizational	attributes	–	like	attack,	target,	
weapon	preferences,	spatial	attack	data,	and	lethality	of	attacks,	this	study	attempts	to	
match	unattributed	terror	attacks	to	known	groups.	
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CHAPTER	1	
INTRODUCTION	
According	to	the	Global	Terrorism	Database	(GTD),	claimed	terrorist	attacks	have	
reduced	over	the	last	few	years.	Attacks	are	cheap	and	easy	to	claim	and	have	a	multiplying	
effect	on	the	attack	which	provides	benefits	to	the	terrorist	organization	(Nacos,	2007).	Yet,	
the	GTD	shows	only	15	percent	of	global	attacks	have	been	claimed	which	suggests	the	
claiming	of	attacks	may	not	be	as	important	to	the	act	of	terrorism	as	suggested	by	Nacos.	
Even	so,	a	compelling	argument	has	been	made	my	Kearns	et	al	(2014)	that	suggests	
that	attributions	of	attacks	are	significant	and	terrorist	attacks	should	be	studied	in	a	way	
that	goes	beyond	the	binary	notion	of	unclaimed	versus	claimed	(Kearns	et	al,	2014).	Their	
argument	is	supported	by	LaFree,	Dylan,	and	Miller’s	argument	that	even	without	claims	
many	attacks	are	attributed	(LaFree,	Dylan,	and	Miller,	2015)	to	different	groups	using	
characteristics	of	the	groups.	The	GTD	corroborates	this	by	having	28	percent	of	the	
recorded	attacks	attributed	to	groups.	The	remainder	of	the	attacks,	however,	are	
unclaimed	and	unattributed.	
Even	with	the	abundance	of	literature	on	terrorist	organizational	behavior	and	
terrorist	attacks,	there	are	few	scholars	researching	claimability.	Fewer	still	research	
attribution,	yet,	the	most	common	question	after	an	attack	is	“Who	did	it?”.		The	dearth	of	
studies	concerning	claims	and	attributions	likely	prevents	many	studies	from	reaching	
their	full	explanatory	ability.	
Because	most	attacks	go	unclaimed,	it	is	important	to	maximize	the	number	of	
attacks	that	are	attributed.	This	thesis	aims	to	fill	this	gap	in	the	current	literature.	By	doing	
so,	it	will	allow	more	robust	studies	on	organizational	lifespan,	organizational	behavior,	
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and	further	the	study	of	attribution	of	terrorist	attacks	to	name	a	few	examples.	
Additionally,	this	thesis	will	help	further	predict	the	perpetrators	of	attacks	in	Pakistan	by	
using	the	group	characteristics	as	indicated	in	historical	attack	data	which	has	been	
collected	by	the	GTD.	
This	thesis	addresses	the	lack	of	attributed	attacks	in	the	GTD	by	creating	an	
artificial	neural	network	that	leverages	the	data	detailed	in	the	GTD	to	make	its	own	
attribution	predictions	for	unattributed	terror	attacks.	The	next	section	of	this	thesis	
covers	the	existing	literature	on	claimability	of	terrorism	followed	by	a	discussion	of	
artificial	neural	networks	and	how	they	are	used.	The	following	chapter	covers	the	
methodology	of	this	study	and	details	the	data	used	and	the	specific	details	regarding	the	
use	of	the	artificial	neural	network	as	it	pertains	to	this	study.	Subsequently,	the	next	
chapter	is	the	analysis	of	the	generated	models	and	their	accuracy	and	confidence	after	
which	will	be	a	conclusion	suggesting	potential	further	areas	of	study	and	alternatives	to	
make	further	study	of	attribution	more	successful.	
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CHAPTER	2	
LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	 In	this	chapter,	I	first	review	a	brief	history	of	Pakistan.	Then,	I	explore	why	some	
terrorist	groups	claim	attacks,	and	examine	the	associated	costs	and	benefits	of	doing	so.	
Following	this	is	an	examination	of	current	scholarship	discussing	how	unclaimed	attacks	
tend	to	go	unclaimed	when	the	costs	outweigh	the	benefits.	Next,	I	discuss	how	groups	are	
able	to	be	identified	by	their	activities	and	how	the	attributes	of	a	group	can	be	used	to	
make	predictions	about	the	groups.	Finally,	this	chapter	discusses	the	artificial	neural	
network	which	is	a	technique	used	to	take	descriptive	data	and	make	classifications	from	
the	data.		
2.1.	A	Brief	History	of	Pakistan	
Pakistan’s	efforts	to	survive	as	a	country	has	been	turbulent	and	filled	with	
uncertainty	(Ahmed,	1996).	Despite	that	most	of	the	Pakistani	population	is	Muslim,	
Pakistan	is	composed	of	overwhelmingly	diverse	ethnic	and	linguistic	groups	which	
strongly	identify	themselves	with	their	own	ethnic	groups.	Major	ethnic	groups	in	Pakistan	
consist	of	Sindhis,	Punjabis,	Pashtuns,	Muhajirs,	Baloch,	Kashmiris,	Bengalis,	Brahuis,	and	
Saraikis	and	there	are	a	few	other	minor	ethnic	groups.	While	English	and	Urdu	are	
Pakistan’s	official	languages,	Pakistan	has	over	20	regional	languages	that	are	spoken	by	
different	ethnic	groups.	The	most	popularly	spoken	languages	are	Punjabi,	Saraiki,	Pashto,	
Sindhi,	Balochi,	Kashmiri	among	several	other	minority	languages.		
This	divergence	of	peoples	and	language	groups	in	Pakistan	was	one	of	the	critical	
driving	reasons	that	the	country	has	been	struggling	to	achieve	a	strong	sense	of	
nationalism	given	tension	among	ethnic	groups	continues	to	exist.	When	President	
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Iskandar	Mirza	led	a	military	mobilization	in	1958	and	appointed	General	Ayub	Kahn	as	
Commander	in	chief,	Pakistan	was	ruled	by	military	rulers	until	1971.	In	1971	under	
President	Yahya	Khan,	Pakistani	Armed	forces	from	West	Pakistan	led	the	suppression	of	
East	Pakistan	and	began	genocide	against	Bengali	(BBC,	2019).	It	became	a	full-scale	civil	
war	in	Pakistan	later	known	as	the	Bangladesh	Liberation	War.	At	the	end	of	the	war,	East	
Pakistan	became	a	separate	country,	current	day’s	Bangladesh.	After	the	Bangladesh	
Liberation	War,	Pakistan	experiences	two	more	military	eras	(from	1977	to	1988	and	from	
1999	to	2007)	and	two	more	democratic	eras	(from	1988	to	1999	and	2008	to	present).	
Currently,	Pakistan	government	is	ruled	by	Prime	Minister	Imran	Khan.		
It	is	rare	to	find	countries	that	are	not	ethnically	heterogeneous.	However,	Pakistan	
is	a	country	with	ethnic,	linguistic,	religious	diversity	and	the	diversity	in	the	country	
affected	negatively	on	the	establishment	of	high	levels	of	polity	and	the	security	of	the	
country.	During	72	years	of	its	history,	Pakistan	has	been	affected	by	conflicts	caused	by	
ethnic	discord	(Majeed,	2010).	The	conflicts	in	Pakistan	range	from	territorial	conflict	
between	different	ethnic	groups	to	violent	extremist	groups	in	the	country	perpetrating	
attacks	targeting	civilians	or	military.		
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As	Figure	2.1.	shows,	Pakistan	is	composed	of	various	ethnic	groups.	This	ethnic	
heterogeneity	led	Pakistan	to	emerge	as	a	country	but	failed	to	create	nationalism	(Jahan,	
1972,	as	cited	in	Majeed,	2010)	causing	ethnic,	and	religious	conflicts,	on	the	basis	of	
language,	territoriality,	and	Caste	(Majeed,	2010).	In	many	cases,	ethnic	diversity	led	to	
competitiveness	within	the	country	among	the	groups	(Smallbone,	Kitching,	&	Athayde,	
2010)	in	development	of	the	region,	representations	in	the	government,	sovereignty,	
allocation	of	resources,	inter-province	migration,	and	language	and	culture	identity	issues	
(Ahmed,	1996).	For	example,	since	Pakistan	is	composed	of	many	linguistic	groups,	
language	is	one	of	the	ways	that	people	identify	themselves	as	a	certain	ethnic	group.	
Suppression	of	Bengalis	and	the	central	government’s	policy	to	prohibit	Bengalis	to	speak	
their	language	led	to	the	separation	of	East	Pakistan	in	1971.		
Figure	2.1.	Ethnic	Groups	in	Pakistan	
Source:	The	University	of	Texas	Libraries,	The	University	of	Texas	at	
Austin	
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Violence	and	insecurity	that	are	related	to	ethnic	fractionalization	are	most	
prevalent	in	Sindh	and	Balochistan	regions.	The	regions’	economic	demographic,	social,	
political,	and	cultural	trends	have	been	shifting	in	consequences	of	ethnic	clashes	between	
ethnic	groups	and	the	central	Pakistani	government	(Ahmed,	1996).	In	1972,	riots	broke	
out	in	Sindh	region	against	the	central	government	which	forced	Sindhi	people	to	speak	
Urdu.	This	demonstration	led	the	central	government	to	make	Sindhi	one	of	the	official	
languages	in	Sindh	region	(Majeed,	2010).		
In	Balochistan,	independence	movements	have	been	popular	since	1947	when	
Balochi	people	were	forcefully	merged	into	Pakistan	by	the	Pakistani	ruling	class	(Laif	and	
Hamza,	2009).	Since	1972,	Baloch	politicians	have	been	struggling	to	secure	higher	political	
positions	in	the	majority	of	Urdu	speaking	central	government	(Majeed,	2010).	
Furthermore,	when	Pakistan	discovered	a	natural	gas	depository	as	a	source	of	energy,	
Balochistan	was	not	able	to	get	benefit	from	the	gas	pipeline,	and	to	today	still	have	
minimum	access	(Laif	and	Hamza,	2009).		
Ethnic	conflict	based	on	territory	is	most	prominent	conflict	in	Pakistan’s	Federally	
Administered	Tribal	Areas	(FATA)	region.		
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FATA	is	a	territory	covering	about	27,500	square	kilometers	along	the	border	
between	northwest	Pakistan	and	southeast	Afghanistan.	This	region	is	home	to	over	3.5	
million	Pashtun	tribesmen	and	about	1.5	million	refugees	from	Afghanistan	(Nawaz,	S.,	
2009).	FATA	has	been	a	region	of	instability	because	of	stronger	ethnic	identity	than	
national	identity.	FATA	zone	was	created	in	the	1800’s	by	India’s	British	colonial	rulers	
when	they	realized	that	they	were	not	able	to	control	the	mountainous	region	and	its	tribes	
militarily	(Rupert,	2018).	The	British	ended	up	letting	the	tribesmen	rule	themselves	with	
an	option	to	intervene	if	they	acted	against	British	colonizers’	wills.	As	a	result	of	this,	
ethnic	Pashtun	people	who	are	religiously	mostly	Muslim,	have	been	living	in	FATA	at	the	
border	of	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan	loosely	living	by	the	British	colonial	laws.	Since	the	end	
of	colonial	period,	Pakistan	has	ruled	FATA	region	through	a	mix	of	British	colonial	laws,	
military	power,	and	government	appointed	representatives	who	receive	the	authority	to	
rule	the	region	(Abbas,	2014;	Rupert,	2018).		
Figure	2.2.	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas	(FATA)	
Source:	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	
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Because	of	Pakistan’s	unique	juxtaposition	of	ethnic	groups,	the	country	has	been	
struggling	to	establish	a	strong	rule	of	law	and	to	keep	the	society	stable.	Instability	of	the	
country	has	been	shown	throughout	the	history	of	Pakistan	as	we	discussed	in	conflicts	in	
FATA	region,	secession	of	Bangladesh,	and	conflicts	in	Sindh	and	Baluchistan.	However,	
internal	conflicts	are	not	the	only	reasons	that	cause	instability	in	Pakistan.	Pakistan	has	
been	home	to	terrorist	groups	such	as	al-Qaeda	and	Taliban.	It	became	more	obvious	and	
known	to	the	public	that	Pakistan	has	been	involved	in	terrorism	when	the	United	States	
caught	Osama	bin	Laden	and	assassinated	him	(Weinbaum,	2014).	
The	history	of	terrorism	in	Pakistan	existed	more	than	three	decades	ago,	rather	
than	abruptly	triggered	after	the	9/11	like	many	other	terrorist	attacks	in	the	middle	east.	
The	origin	of	Pakistani	militant	groups	started	as	a	method	to	counter	the	Soviet	influence	
during	the	Soviet	occupation	of	Afghanistan	in	the	1980s.	To	limit	the	spread	of	Soviet	
ideology	in	South	Asia,	American	and	Pakistani	intelligence	agencies	supported	the	
Mujahideen,	who	fights	against	non-Muslim	forces	(Yusuf,	2014).	During	this	process,	the	
Pakistan-Afghanistan	border	was	not	strictly	monitored	to	allow	militants	to	move	across	
the	border	and	conduct	operations	in	Afghanistan.	However,	the	freedom	of	controlling	the	
Pakistan-Afghanistan	border,	which	is	the	FATA,	led	to	more	severe	instability	within	
Pakistan	after	9/11.		
The	FATA	region	has	been	the	most	contested	territory	between	Pakistan	and	
Afghanistan.	Pashtuns	are	the	majority	of	the	population	in	FATA;	about	15	million	
Pashtuns	live	in	Afghanistan	while	25	million	live	in	Pakistan	along	the	Durand	Line1	
                                                        
1 Durand	Line	is	the	2,640-kilometer	border	between	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan.	It	is	the	
result	of	an	agreement	between	Sir	Montimer	Durand,	a	secretary	of	the	British	Indian	
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(Nawaz,	S.,	2009;	Tajik,	2014).		Since	the	Pashtuns	were	separated	by	the	artificial	border	
drawn	by	the	British,	the	people	in	FATA	identify	themselves	as	Pashtuns	instead	of	Afghan	
or	Pakistani.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	poor	border	security	in	the	FATA,	it	has	been	easy	for	
Afghan	Taliban	leaders	to	recruit	soldiers	from	Pashtuns.	Taliban	leaders	used	this	tactic	
after	the	US	invasion	of	Afghanistan	to	fight	the	outside	forces	(Nawaz,	S.,	2009).	In	an	
effort	to	monitor	the	border	and	minimize	the	effects	of	Taliban	getting	into	Pakistan,	
Pakistan	government	launched	a	mission	called	“Operation	Meezan.”	Although	its	purpose	
was	to	stop	the	influx	of	Pashtuns	living	on	Afghanistan	side	of	FATA	to	Pakistan,	Pakistan	
military	was	told	not	to	engage	with	Afghan	Taliban	and	only	arrest	the	others	such	as	al-
Qaeda	members	from	Central	Asia	and	other	Arab	countries	(Haider,	2014;	Nawaz,	A.,	
2018).	Because	of	communication	issues	between	Pakistan	government	and	the	military,	
the	operation	ended	in	failure.	Pakistan’s	effort	to	bring	stability	in	the	country	and	
establish	security	has	not	been	successful.	Currently,	there	are	still	numerous	terrorist	
groups	operating	within	Pakistan	and	along	the	borders	between	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan.		
In	this	thesis,	I	chose	Pakistan	as	a	case	study	for	two	reasons.	First,	Pakistan	has	
many	cases	of	active	terrorist	activities	so	there	are	a	lot	of	data	available	to	study	from.	
Second,	the	trends	of	terrorism	in	Pakistan	resembles	the	global	terrorism	trends	which	is	
represented	in	the	Global	Terrorism	Database	that	I	will	use	as	the	major	data	source	in	
this	thesis.	Figure	2.3	shows	the	number	of	attacks	and	the	number	of	kills	by	terrorist	
                                                        
government,	and	Abdur	Rahman	Khan,	the	emir,	or	ruler,	of	Afghanistan.	The	agreement	
was	signed	on	November	12,	1893,	in	Kabul,	Afghanistan.	The	British	established	the	
Durand	Line	after	conquering	the	Pashtuns.	85%	of	the	Durand	Line	follows	the	rivers	and	
other	physical	features,	not	ethnic	boundaries.	It	split	the	Pashtuns	into	two	separate	
countries,	Afghanistan,	and	Pakistan	(Schons,	2011).		
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attack	on	a	global	scale	from	1970	to	2018.	We	observe	a	fluctuation	in	the	number	of	
attacks	and	the	number	of	kills	by	year	from	1970	to	2009,	and	there	is	a	sharp	increase	in	
the	attacks	and	kills	after	2010.		Figure	2.4	shows	the	number	of	attacks	and	the	number	of	
kills	by	terrorist	groups	by	year	in	Pakistan	from	1970	to	2018.	As	we	see	in	the	global	
trend,	the	same	trend	occurs	in	Pakistan;	there	is	a	fluctuation	in	the	number	of	attacks	and	
the	number	of	kills	by	year	from	1970	to	2009,	and	we	see	a	sharp	increase	after	2010.	
Since	both	global	terrorism	trend	and	the	trend	in	Pakistan	significantly	resemble	each	
other,	the	analysis	on	Pakistan	will	later	be	possible	to	generalize	on	the	global	terrorism	
trend.		
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Figure	2.3.	Global	Trend:	Number	of	Attacks	and	Number	of	Kills	by	Year	
Source:	Global	Terrorism	Database	(GTD)	
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2.2.	Why	Groups	Claim	Attacks	
	 There	are	a	number	of	reasons	why	terrorist	organizations	claim	attacks.	
Fundamentally,	the	definition	of	terrorism	requires	an	attack	to	speak	to	a	larger	audience	
than	the	immediate	victims	of	the	attack	itself	and	is	in	pursuit	of	a	greater	overall	goal	
(Richards,	2014).	If	the	intention	of	terrorist	attacks	is	to	speak	to	a	larger	audience	as	is	
common	among	most	definitions	of	terrorism,	then	claiming	attacks	becomes	the	most	
effective	way	of	spreading	the	message	and	is	often	done	through	media	outlets.	These	
media	outlets	then	sensationalize	the	attack	and	the	messaging	behind	giving	greater	
attention	to	the	perpetrators	of	attacks	(Barnett	&	Reynolds,	2009).	Nacos	(2007)	argues	
that	“the	inevitable	and	primary	role	of	communication	and	propaganda	is	the	terrorist	
design	and	the	contemporary	mass	media’s	appetite	to	facilitate	the	need	of	virtually	all	
terrorists	to	have	their	deeds	publicized.”		
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Figure	2.4.	Pakistan	Trend:	Number	of	Attacks	and	Number	of	Kills	by	Year	
Source:	Global	Terrorism	Database	
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	 While	the	media	is	used	to	spread	the	message	for	the	terrorist	organizations,	the	
message	is	used	for	the	following	reasons:	competition	among	terrorist	organizations,	
signaling	strength,	ideology,	religion,	and	state	retaliation	(Wright,	2009).		
For	instance,	intergroup	competition	among	terrorist	organizations	sometimes	dictates	the	
decisions	to	claim	or	not	claims	attacks.	The	intergroup	competition	among	terrorist	
organizations	depicts	situations	in	which	there	are	multiple	terrorist	organizations	all	
vying	for	the	same	resources	(these	resources	being	both	monetary	as	well	as	masses	of	
people	who	represent	potential	recruits).	Hoffman	(2010)	argues	when	the	number	of	
terrorist	organizations	increases,	the	more	difficult	it	is	for	actual	perpetrators	to	
distinguish	themselves	from	groups	that	had	not	participated	(Hoffman,	2010).	To	
distinguishing	themselves	from	less	active	gr5oups,	terrorist	organizations	use	claimed	
attacks	to	appeal	to	their	audience	to	instill	the	idea	they	are	the	group	to	follow	or	
support.		
	 The	second	reason	for	claiming	terrorist	attacks	is	signaling	strength.	The	signaling	
of	strength	is	similar	to	competition	among	terrorist	organizations	with	the	exception	that	
the	signals	are	intended	for	other	outside	audiences.	Outside	audiences	can	be	rival	
terrorist	organizations,	local	and	regional	governments,	or	the	pool	of	potential	recruits	for	
the	group.	By	claiming	a	successful	terrorist	attack	against	a	military	target	the	group	is	
able	to	project	its	power	and	tactical	ability	to	not	only	its	own	audience	but	also	as	a	
message	to	governments	that	the	group	is	strong	and	capable	enough	to	achieve	its	goals	
(Kidd	&	Walter,	2006).		
	 Claiming	attacks	can	also	increase	the	incitement	for	the	ideological	and	religious	
goals	of	the	terrorist	organization	in	the	local	public.	They	are	used	to	appeal	to	the	idea	
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that	the	act	of	violence	is	intended	to	further	the	ideological	or	religious	goals	of	the	group.	
In	the	case	of	religious	motivations,	the	attack	is	done	to	benefit	the	religion	and	that	it	is	
the	right	thing	to	do.	Hoffman	(2010)	and	Drake	(1998)	both	suggest	that	ideology	and	
religion	provide	a	motive	and	framework	for	terrorist	organizations	to	act.		
	 Lastly,	claiming	a	terror	attack	is	used	to	manipulate	counter-terror	responses	from	
both	the	local	and	international	governments.	There	are	different	ways	in	which	claiming	
attacks	affect	counter-terror	efforts.	On	one	hand,	terrorist	organizations	use	the	attacks	in	
order	to	provoke	a	violent	counter-terror	response.	The	result	of	which	would	be	the	
terrorist	organization	using	the	reprisal	as	a	means	of	framing	their	conflict	against	an	
‘oppressive	government’	or	‘the	west.’	On	the	other	hand,	eliciting	a	weak	response	from	
the	government	would	have	a	similar	effect	of	signaling	strength	and	reinforce	the	
organizations	ability	to	provide	better	than	the	government.	Still,	terrorist	organizations	
sometimes	claim	attacks	perpetrated	by	other	groups	with	the	intention	to	outbid	and	
increase	the	notoriety	of	the	group	(Kearns,	Conlon,	&	Young,	2014).		
	 These	reasons	for	claiming	attacks	are	represented	by	the	strategic	goals	of	
organizations	through	the	categories	of	intimidation,	attrition,	spoiling,	outbidding,	and	
provocation	(Kidd	&	Walter,	2006).	Intimidation	represents	the	group’s	ability	to	punish	
and	the	local	government’s	inability	to	stop	the	violence.	Attrition	is	the	group	expressing	
its	resolve	by	forcing	itself	and	the	government	to	pay	higher	costs	(of	life	and	material)	
over	time.	Spoiling	is	the	act	of	terrorist	organizations	creating	doubt	and	mistrust	between	
two	parties	attempting	to	negotiate	peace.	Outbidding	represents	competition	between	
groups	for	limited	resources.	Lastly,	provocation	is	used	to	cause	the	government	to	over-
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react	whereby	the	population	becomes	alienated	and	the	terrorists	cause	becomes	more	
appealing.	
2.3.	Why	Groups	Do	Not	Claim	Attacks	
Although	claiming	attacks	yields	benefits	to	terrorist	organizations	on	certain	
occasions,	numerous	costs	are	also	associated	with	claiming	attacks.	This	is	due	to	the	
organizational	structure	of	terrorist	groups.	There	is	an	assumption	that	the	leadership	of	
organizations	is	rational	actors	and	they	are	conducting	cost–benefit	analyses	when	
determining	whether	to	claim	an	attack	or	not	(Abrahms	&	Conrad,	2017).	The	core	idea	is	
that	if	the	political	impact	outweighs	the	risks,	then	the	attack	is	claimed;	otherwise,	it	is	
not.	For	example,	if	a	terrorist	organization	organized	a	bombing	targeting	occupation	
forces	and	was	successful	in	the	attack	with	minimal	casualties	then	the	attack	is	likely	to	
be	claimed.	Conversely,	if	a	similar	attack	is	planned	and	many	more	innocent	civilian	
women	and	children	are	killed	then	the	attack	is	unlikely	to	be	claimed.	Max	Abrahams	
elaborates	on	denial	of	organizational	involvement.	According	to	Abrahams,	“many	militant	
leaders	have	been	reluctant	to	claim	credit	for	civilian	attacks	due	to	the	expected	political	
fallout	(Abrahams,	2018).”	Abrahams	uses	the	example	of	credit	claiming	by	Taliban	using	
the	GTD.	His	studies	show	that	leaders	are	more	likely	to	not	claim	the	attacks	if	the	victims	
of	the	attacks	are	mostly	civilians.	Abrahams’	analysis	shows	that	among	all	the	claimed	
attacks	by	Taliban,	only	27%	targeted	civilians	while	42%	targeted	government	or	military	
(Abrahams,	2018).	As	we	can	see	in	this	example,	Taliban	claimed	attacks	when	the	victims	
were	civilians	who	have	politically	influence.	This	phenomenon	might	be	caused	by	the	
characteristics	of	Taliban	as	a	terrorist	organization	which	started	as	a	Sunni	Islamic	
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fundamentalist	political	movement.	Post	1990’s,	the	Taliban	had	thousands	of	followers	
which	was	much	larger	than	any	political	parties	in	Afghanistan	(Dorronsoro,	2002).		
Applying	Abrahams’	analogy	of	the	chances	of	claiming	attacks	and	the	type	of	
victims,	I	conducted	analyses	on	all	terrorist	attacks	in	Pakistan.		
	
Figure	2.5	shows	the	comparison	between	civilian	and	government,	police,	and	
military	(GPM)	for	number	of	attacks	and	the	number	of	kills	(lethality)	of	attacks.	The	
number	of	known	and	unknown	attacks	for	civilian	surpass	the	number	of	known	and	
unknown	attacks	for	GPM	attacks.	Even	though	on	average,	civilians	have	been	victims	of	
terrorist	attacks	compared	to	GPM,	there	is	a	higher	number	of	unknown	civilian	attacks	
than	the	attacks	targeted	at	GPM.	Therefore,	Pakistan’s	number	of	attacks	by	terrorist	
groups	follows	Abrahams’	argument	on	why	terrorist	groups	do	not	claim	attacks	when	the	
victims	are	civilians.	On	the	number	of	kills,	there	are	a	greater	number	of	kills	for	
Figure	2.5.	Civilian	and	GPM	attacks	
Comparison	
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unknown	attacks	than	known	attacks	when	the	victims	were	civilians.	There	are	a	greater	
number	of	kills	for	known	attacks	than	unknown	attacks	when	the	victims	were	GPM.		
There	is	a	discrepancy	when	applying	Abrahams’	argument	on	less	likelihood	of	
claiming	attacks	when	civilians	are	the	victims.	The	reasoning	comes	from	the	fact	that	
Abrahams	uses	claimed	and	unclaimed	attacks	while	I	use	attributed	and	unattributed	
attacks.	The	difference	between	a	claimed	attacks	and	attributed	attacks	is	as	follows:	
claimed	attacks	are	the	ones	that	the	perpetrating	terrorist	groups	put	out	a	formal	media	
coverage	claiming	the	attacks.	Attributed	attacks	are	the	ones	that	the	perpetrating	
terrorist	group	has	been	identified	by	a	third	party,	such	as	multiple	news	organizations	or	
witnesses,	that	the	attacks	have	been	done	by	a	particular	terrorist	group.	Furthermore,	
Abrahams	uses	the	example	of	Taliban	only	while	this	thesis	uses	all	terrorist	attacks	in	
Pakistan	as	a	sample.	At	a	basic	analysis	level,	the	Pakistan	example	in	this	thesis	agrees	
with	Abraham’s	argument;	when	the	civilians	are	targeted	as	victims	of	terrorist	attacks,	it	
is	less	likely	to	be	claimed	and	attributed.	However,	the	reason	that	Taliban	is	less	likely	to	
claim	attacks	targeted	to	civilians	because	they	are	politically	influential	needs	to	be	
further	examined	in	Pakistan	example	to	fully	understand	why	attacks	are	unattributed	
when	they	are	targeting	civilians.		
Scholars	suggest	that	while	the	leadership	of	terrorist	organizations	is	normally	
synchronized	and	working	towards	the	same	goals,	the	regular	members	of	the	group	are	
much	more	heterogeneous	(Kearns,	Conlon,	&	Young,	2014).	The	nature	of	this	
arrangement	leads	to	the	terrorist’s	dilemma	as	presented	by	Shapiro	(Shapiro,	2013).	In	
his	book,	The	Terrorist’s	Dilemma,	he	shows	this	dynamic	between	leadership	and	members	
of	the	group	where	more	control	being	exerted	by	the	leadership	over	the	members	
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increases	the	risk	of	reprisal	to	the	leadership	of	the	group.		Reprisals	tend	to	come	in	the	
form	of	leadership	decapitations	conducted	through	drone	strikes	in	recent	years.	The	
results	of	that	introduce	the	concept	of	the	principle-agent	problem.	The	principle-agent	
problem	highlights	a	situation	that	reduced	control	and	communication	from	the	
leadership	of	terrorist	organizations	result	in	membership	committing	attacks	and	
targeting	populations	that	do	not	advance	the	goals	of	the	organization.			
Furthermore,	many	terrorist	attacks	go	unclaimed	because	the	attacks	have	failed	to	
achieve	their	goal.	Instead	of	signaling	weakness,	the	attack	goes	unclaimed	to	prevent	the	
terrorist	organization	from	looking	bad.	Related	to	this,	changing	dynamics	in	public	
sentiment	on	the	ground	also	has	an	impact	on	whether	or	not	an	attack	is	claimed.	This	
could	be	due	to	successes	in	counter-terrorism	efforts	or	even	unintended	consequences	of	
attacks.	
Regardless	of	the	specific	reasonings	for	whether	an	attack	is	claimed	or	not,	the	
disparity	of	claimed	versus	unclaimed	attacks	as	a	significant	problem.	As	we	can	see	in	
Figure	2.6,	the	number	of	attacks	that	have	been	claimed	globally	is	represented	as	only	9	
percent	while	in	Pakistan	attacks	are	claimed	13	percent	of	the	time.	
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Figure	2.6.	Global	and	Pakistan	Claimed	vs	Unclaimed	Attacks		
(Data	collected	from	the	Global	Terrorism	Database)	
	
	 With	so	much	data	concerning	the	claimed	attacks	missing	from	scholarly	
knowledge,	it	is	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	provide	good	counter-terrorism	advice	and	
produce	accurate	studies	on	specific	group	behavior.	This	is	the	gap	in	the	data	this	thesis	
is	attempting	to	fill.		
According	to	Kearns,	Conlon,	and	Young,	each	terrorist	organization	has	a	number	of	
habits,	patterns,	or	calling	cards	that	separate	the	group	from	others	(Kearns,	Conlon,	&	
Young,	2014).	 	
2.4.	Edge	Cases:	One	Hit	Wonders	and	Lone	Wolfs		
	 There	are	a	couple	of	types	of	terrorist	behaviors	that	will	not	be	measurable	
through	this	thesis,	however,	they	are	still	relevant	and	must	be	addressed.	The	first	type	of	
attack	are	attacks	from	typically	smaller	groups	that	only	ever	attack	once	or	very	rarely	
known	as	one-hit	wonders	(Blomberg	&	Engel,	2010).	The	Blomberg	and	Engel	study	
shows	that	the	majority	of	groups	end	up	in	this	category;	most	groups	commit	between	
one	and	five	attacks	overall.		
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	 The	second	type	of	terrorism	that	this	thesis	won’t	be	able	to	account	for	are	lone	
wolf	attacks.	A	lone	wolf	attack	is	where	an	individual,	usually	operates	in	their	own	
nation’s	territory	but	separated	from	a	terrorist	organization,	commits	a	terrorist	attack	
and	the	individual	claims	to	represent	a	terrorist	organization.	Examples	of	this	are	the	
multiple	attacks	in	France	and	the	San	Bernardino	shooting	in	the	United	States.	Forster	
and	Hader	cite	the	Brussels	and	San	Bernardino	attacks	to	explain	the	way	homegrown	
attacks	increase	operational	security	for	the	attack	(Forster	&	Hader,	2016).	This,	in	turn,	
reduces	the	likelihood	the	attack	will	be	discovered	ahead	of	time.	Consequently,	due	to	the	
nature	of	these	types	of	attacks,	there	is	often	little	attack	data	available	or	there	are	
extremely	loose	connections	between	the	individuals	perpetrating	the	attack	and	the	
groups	they	claim	to	represent.	Accepting	the	limitations	of	the	edge	cases,	the	Global	
Terrorism	Database	provides	ample	data	describing	attacks	within	Pakistan.		
2.5.	Terrorist	Groups	and	Characteristics	
Terrorist	groups	have	unique	characteristics	that	distinguish	each	group	from	
others.	They	are	fundamentally	and	strategically	organized	and	operated	differently	from	
traditional	definitions	of	criminal	behavior.	By	observing	the	differences	and	the	traits	of	
terrorist	groups,	it	is	possible	to	sort	out	terrorist	organizations.	It	is	also	possible	to	
identify	specific	terrorist	organizations’	dependence	on	each	group’s	behaviors,	goals,	and	
other	characteristics	they	pursue.		
To	verify	this	claim,	scholars	have	been	studying	ways	to	identify	and	classify	
terrorist	organizations.	Post,	Ruby,	and	Shaw	explain	that	the	features	of	terrorist	groups	
can	and	must	be	tailored	to	the	type	of	organization,	particular	region	or	country	involved	
(Smith,	Damphouse,	&	Roberts,	2006)	(Post,	Ruby,	&	Shaw,	2002)	(Ullah,	Hussain,	&	Sajid,	
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2015)	(Forster	&	Hader,	2016).	In	the	research,	they	used	five	principle	types	of	radical	
groups	which	are	nationalist	separatists,	social	revolutionaries,	religious	fundamentalists,	
nontraditional	religious	extremists,	including	“new	religions”,	and	right-wing	groups	and	
evaluated	individual	group’s	behaviors	and	indicators	to	categorize	into	the	five	types	of	
radical	groups	(Hecht-Nielsen,	1988).	Their	research	showed	that	groups	that	become	
terrorist	organizations	have	similar	characteristics	which	are	group	ideology	and	goals;	
experience	with	violence;	authoritarian	leadership	and	decision	making;	organizational	
processes	such	as	recruitment,	training,	and	attrition;	and	group	psychological	processes	
such	as	humiliation	and	need	for	revenge;	and	sense	of	threat	and	negative	
characterization	of	the	enemy	(Post,	Ruby	and	Shaw,	2011).	Furthermore,	Smith,	
Damphousse,	and	Roberts	did	a	similar	study	which	categorizes	terrorist	groups	and	
incidents	into	three	types	of	domestic	terrorism;	left	wing,	right	wing,	and	single	issue	
(Smith,	Damphousse,	and	Roberts,	2006).	Their	study	found	that	terrorism	involves	people	
or	groups	that	are	motivated	by	political	or	social	goals,	ideological	justification,	and	
considerable	forethought	and	planning	(Smith,	Damphousse,	and	Roberts,	2006).	These	
specific	characteristics	are	what	the	authors	identified	as	unique	strategies	and	
characteristics	of	terrorist	organizations	compared	to	traditional	criminality.		
Studies	by	Post,	Ruby,	and	Shaw	and	Smith,	Damphousse	and	Roberts	show	that	
terrorist	organizations	behave	differently	from	traditional	criminals.	Studies	also	indicate	
that	terrorist	organizations	can	be	categorized	by	their	behaviors,	goals,	and	regions	they	
operate.	Therefore,	it	is	also	possible	to	recognize	the	unique	behaviors	of	unidentified	
terrorist	groups	and	make	educated	assumptions	on	which	terrorist	organization	
conducted	specific	attacks	using	artificial	neural	networks.	
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CHAPTER	3	
METHODOLOGY	
	 This	chapter	begins	with	exploratory	analyses	of	the	data	used,	then	discusses	the	
use	of	the	artificial	neural	network	to	classify	unclaimed	terror	attacks	within	Pakistan.	It	
begins	with	a	description	of	the	variables	used	then	continues	with	a	discussion	of	the	
construction	of	the	model.		
3.1.	Artificial	Neural	Networks		
The	neural	network	changes	the	typical	computing	model.		In	classical	computing,	
we	provide	the	computer	with	data	and	a	set	of	rules,	then	the	computer	gives	the	answer.	
However,	neural	networks	change	the	computing	paradigm;	once	data	and	the	answers	are	
given	to	the	neural	network,	it	is	left	to	“learn”	the	rules	and	patterns	that	connect	the	data	
to	the	answers.		Figure	3.1	indicates	the	workflow	of	a	neural	network:	each	element	will	
be	discussed	in	detail.	
	
	
Figure	3.1.	Flowchart	of	Neural	Network	
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	 Neural	Networks	take	preprocessed	data	and	use	weights	to	assign	value	to	the	
various	input	variables.	While	artificial	neural	networks	can	accomplish	tasks	ranging	from	
machine	vision	to	image	recognition,	this	thesis	uses	the	network	to	accomplish	
multivariate	classification	(Hecht-Nielsen,	1988).	The	network	takes	in	preprocessed	data	
ensuring	the	data	is	normalized	to	make	the	learning	easier	for	the	network.	That	is,	the	
data	should	have	small	values	(ideally	between	0,	and	1)	and	be	homogenous	(have	roughly	
the	same	range)	(Chollet	&	Allaire,	2018).		
Once	the	data	has	been	vectorized	and	normalized,	it	is	ready	to	be	fed	through	the	
network.	If	we	imagine	the	input	data	as	a	2D	matrix	each	input	represents	an	entire	row	of	
data.	A	batch	is	a	defined	number	of	rows	that	have	been	input	into	the	network.	Lastly,	an	
epoch	represents	the	entire	dataset	of	rows	input	into	the	network.	For	example,	if	there	
are	10,000	rows	in	the	dataset	and	the	batch	size	is	set	to	512,	a	batch	is	512	rows	being	
input	and	every	10,000	rows	being	input	represents	an	epoch.	
	 The	next	major	pieces	of	the	neural	network	are	the	layers	and	weights.	These	are	
typically	represented	as	nodes	with	associated	weights	as	seen	in	the	following	figure:	
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Figure	3.2.	Example	of	a	Node/Neuron	
	 As	seen	in	Figure	3.2,	each	node	can	have	any	number	of	inputs	and	any	number	of	
outputs.	The	only	limitations	are	the	input	layer	which	will	have	a	number	of	nodes	that	
match	the	shape	of	the	input	and	the	output	layer	which	will	have	a	number	of	outputs	that	
match	the	number	of	classification	options	(the	dependent	variable).	Each	neuron	has	
associated	with	a	weight	for	each	incoming	input	and	uses	the	weights,	inputs,	and	an	
activation	function	to	produce	an	output	to	send	to	subsequent	nodes.	The	weights	are	all	
initialized	by	assigning	them	random	values	that	are	near	0.	The	activation	functions	are	
determined	based	on	the	type	of	data	and	results	the	machine	is	looking	for.	For	this	paper,	
the	first	two	layers	will	use	a	rectifier	function	to	produce	outputs	that	represent	the	
greater	value	of	0	or	the	input	times	weight.	
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Figure	3.3.	Rectified	Linear	Unit	Function		
Source:	Chollet	&	Allaire,	2018	
	 The	final	output	layer	uses	a	SoftMax	activation	function.	The	SoftMax	function	
behaves	like	a	logit	function	that	has	been	generalized	to	produce	a	probability	for	each	
classification	option	with	the	restriction	that	all	the	probabilities	sum	to	1.	For	example,	
with	classes	labeled	A,	B,	and	C	the	SoftMax	function	may	produce	an	output:	A:	0.7,	B:	0.1,	
C:	0.2.	These	outputs	can	be	thought	of	as	the	network’s	confidence	in	each	classification.	
The	largest	value	ends	up	being	the	prediction	for	that	set	of	inputs.		
	 The	network	then	uses	a	Loss	function	to	calculate	the	difference	between	the	
predicted	answer	and	the	real	answer.	This	is	accomplished	using	stochastic	gradient	
descent,	where	the	function	looks	at	the	slope	of	the	plane	created	by	the	loss	function	and	
tries	to	find	the	lowest	point.	This	lowest	point	represents	the	least	amount	of	difference	
between	predicted	answers	and	real	answers.	
	 After	each	batch,	the	optimizer	function	takes	the	current	loss	value	and	adjusts	all	
the	weights	of	the	nodes	in	the	network	in	an	attempt	to	further	minimize	the	loss	score	
during	the	next	batch.	This	cycle	of	feeding	data,	calculating	loss,	and	updating	the	weights	
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of	the	nodes	is	how	the	neural	network	‘learns’	across	the	epochs	of	training	data.	Figure	
3.4	displays	the	full	network	representation	for	this	thesis.	
	
Figure	3.4.		Structure	of	Hidden	Layers	
	 Once	the	model	is	finished	being	trained	on	the	training	data	the	test	data	is	then	
input	into	the	network.	The	test	data	then	calculates	an	accuracy	score	for	the	model	which	
represents	the	percentage	of	times	the	model	was	able	to	correctly	predict	the	group	that	
claimed	the	attack.	After	obtaining	this	score,	the	model	is	then	measured	against	the	
validation	set	to	benchmark	the	performance	of	this	model.	The	model	can	then	be	fine-
tuned	as	needed	in	order	to	increase	the	accuracy,	however,	each	time	the	model	should	be	
tested	against	the	validation	set	to	simulate	‘real	world’	improvements	to	the	model.	
	 Finally,	once	the	model	is	sufficiently	trained	and	validated	the	unknown	attacks	are	
then	used	as	inputs	to	the	model	and	the	output	will	be	the	model’s	predictions	for	each	
unclaimed	attack.	In	summary,	the	neural	network	takes	the	attribute	data	of	each	terrorist	
attack	in	Pakistan	and	makes	a	prediction	of	the	group	name	that	is	most	likely	to	have	
committed	the	attack.	
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3.2.	Data	
	 The	data	used	comes	from	the	widely	used	Global	Terrorism	Database	(GTD).	
Although	there	are	numerous	definitions	for	terrorism	the	GTD	defines	terrorism	as	“the	
threatened	or	actual	use	of	illegal	force	and	violence	by	a	non-state	actor	to	attain	a	
political,	economic,	religious,	or	social	goal	through	fear,	coercion,	or	intimidation	(START,	
2018).	Due	to	this	definition	the	GTD	uses	three	criteria	for	an	event	to	be	included	in	the	
database:	(1)	The	act	must	be	aimed	at	attaining	a	political,	economic,	religious,	or	social	
goal,	(2)	There	must	be	evidence	of	an	intention	to	coerce,	intimidate,	or	convey	some	
other	message	to	a	larger	audience	than	the	immediate	victims,	(3)	The	action	must	be	
outside	the	context	of	legitimate	warfare	activities	(START,	2018).		
	 Since	the	case	study	is	primarily	concerned	with	Pakistan,	a	subset	of	the	GTD	is	
created	to	include	only	attacks	that	happened	within	Pakistan	itself	as	coded	by	the	GTD.	
The	following	independent	variables	are	then	selected	to	represent	the	behavioral	patterns	
that	different	terrorist	organizations	within	Pakistan	exhibit.	The	following	table	indicates	
the	summary	statistics	for	the	non-categorical	variables	of	the	known	and	unknown	
datasets.		
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3.2.1.	Independent	Variables		
	 I	chose	year,	latitude	and	longitude,	attack	type,	weapon	type,	target	type,	number	of	
fatalities,	presence	of	suicide	bomber	for	independent	variables.	Below	are	the	
explanations	and	reasons	why	I	chose	them	as	my	independent	variables.	
3.2.1.1.	Year.	First,	Year	is	a	numeric	variable	that	is	a	measurement	of	the	year	the	event	
took	place.	This	variable	controls	for	attacks	that	happen	within	group	active	periods.	That	
is,	if	a	group	was	active	from	1985	through	1993	the	network	will	be	unlikely	to	predict	
that	group	to	have	committed	an	attack	in	2016.	When	considering	the	year’s	impact	on	the	
reason’s	attacks	are	claimed,	it	has	an	effect	on	each	one.	Each	attack	whether	pursuing	the	
goal	of	intimidation,	attribution,	spoiling,	outbidding,	or	provocation	will	have	a	temporal	
aspect	to	it.	
Table	1.	Summary	Statistics	
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3.2.1.2.	Latitude	and	Longitude.	Second,	and	third	are	latitude	and	longitude	variables.	
They	are	both	numeric	and	represent	the	geocoded	coordinates	of	the	city	where	the	attack	
occurred.	In	order	to	keep	as	many	data	points	in	the	dataset,	for	this	thesis,	the	specificity	
attribute	of	the	coordinates	is	ignored.	The	specificity	variable	accounts	for	instances	
where	the	exact	coordinate	is	unknown	and	indicates	which	administrative	level	centroid	
is	used	to	code	the	event.	The	result	of	the	specificity	is	approximations	that	will	still	be	
useful	for	targeting	information.	These	variables	will	control	for	the	region	of	the	country	
the	group	tends	to	target.	This	will	help	the	network	identify	groups	that	tend	to	target	
specific	regions	in	the	country	and	is	an	important	aspect	of	terrorist	targeting	decisions	
(Drake,	1998).	Similar	to	the	year	variable,	the	location	variables	play	an	important	role	in	
furthering	all	goals	because	every	attack	will	have	a	spatial	component	to	it.	
3.2.1.3.	Attack	Types.	The	fourth	independent	variable	is	the	attack	type.	It’s	a	categorical	
variable	that	represents	the	general	method	of	attack	for	the	event.	The	following	options	
are	recorded	based	on	a	hierarchy	where,	in	the	case	of	multiple	methods,	the	preceding	
category	will	be	recorded:	Assassination,	Hijacking,	Kidnapping,	Barricade	Incident,	
Bombing/Explosion,	Armed	Assault,	Unarmed	Assault,	Facility/Infrastructure	Attack,	and	
Unknown.	This	variable	represents	the	preferred	attack	type	of	the	groups	with	the	
assumption	that	groups	tend	to	focus	on	types	of	attacks	that	reflect	the	goals	of	the	group.	
The	type	of	attack	used	speaks	to	the	goals	of	the	group.	For	example,	when	trying	to	
intimidate	a	more	lethal	attack	type	may	be	used	while	pursuing	attrition	a	softer	attack	
type	may	be	used.	Further,	when	outbidding,	there	may	be	an	increase	in	the	violence	of	
the	type	of	attack	in	order	to	show	strength.	When	pursuing	the	goal	of	provocation,	attack	
type	is	less	important.	
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3.2.1.4.	Weapons	Type.	The	fifth	independent	variable	is	the	categorical	variable	weapon	
type.	The	variable	records	the	main	weapons	used	during	the	event.	These	categories	are	
Biological,	Chemical,	Radiological,	Nuclear,	Firearms,	Explosives,	Fake	Weapons,	
Incendiary,	Melee,	Vehicle,	Sabotage	Equipment,	Other,	and	Unknown.	This	variable	is	
intended	to	control	for	potential	militancy	of	groups	and	holds	the	assumption	that	groups	
tend	to	use	the	same	equipment	over	multiple	attacks.	Additionally,	weapon	types	reflect	
how	a	group	prefers	to	operate.	For	example,	groups	that	prefer	suicide	attacks	will	have	a	
tendency	towards	explosives	instead	of	knives.	Additionally,	as	Palfy	indicates,	weapon	
systems	used	by	groups	further	a	purpose.	Groups	will	choose	their	weapon	systems	based	
on	whether	they	are	looking	for	lethality	or	fear	for	example	(Palfy,	2003).	As	such,	the	
weapon	selection	directly	relates	to	the	overall	goals	of	the	groups.	Intimidation	and	
outbidding	should	indicate	different	weapon	selections	as	opposed	to	provocation	or	
spoiling.	
3.2.1.5.	Target	Type.	The	sixth	independent	variable	is	the	target	or	victim	type.	It’s	a	
categorical	variable	that	captures	the	general	type	of	the	target.	The	categories	are	
Business,	Government	(general),	Police,	Military,	Abortion-Related,	Airports	and	Aircraft,	
Government	(diplomatic),	Educational	Institution,	Food	or	Water	Supply,	Journalists	and	
Media,	Maritime,	NGO,	Other,	Private	Citizens	and	Property,	Religious	Figures/Institutions,	
Telecommunication,	Terrorists/Non-State	Militias,	Tourists,	Transportation	(other	than	
aviation),	Unknown,	Utilities,	Violent	Political	Parties.	The	variable	indicates	the	goals	and	
targeting	priorities	of	the	terrorist	organizations	as	the	assumption	is	that	the	groups	will	
continue	to	attack	the	same	types	of	targets	that	fit	their	organizational	narrative	and	goals.	
This	variable	speaks	loudest	to	the	goals	of	provocation	and	intimidation	where	the	groups	
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would	be	targeting	government,	police,	or	military	targets.	Additionally,	the	target	selection	
furthers	the	goals	of	spoiling	by	specifically	targeting	the	groups	or	institutions	coming	to	
an	agreement.	
3.2.1.6.	Number	of	Fatalities.	Seventh,	I	use	a	numeric	variable	representing	the	number	
of	fatalities	for	the	incident.	This	number	includes	all	victims	and	attackers	who	died	as	a	
direct	result	of	the	incident.	This	variable	will	control	for	the	overall	violence	level	of	the	
groups.	The	assumption	is	that	violent	groups	will	have	larger	numbers	of	fatalities	
associated	with	their	events	and	they	will	be	involved	in	these	violent	events	more	often.	
The	number	of	fatalities	relates	to	all	goals.	For	instances	of	intimidation,	provocation,	and	
outbidding	a	higher	number	of	fatalities	may	seem	appropriate.	However,	when	pursuing	
the	goals	of	attrition	or	spoiling,	lower	fatalities	may	be	more	prudent	to	the	group.	
3.2.1.7.	Presence	of	a	Suicide	Bomber.	The	eighth	and	last	independent	variable	is	a	
binary	variable	that	represents	whether	a	suicide	bomber	was	used	in	the	event.	This	
controls	for	groups	that	are	willing	to	use	suicide	bombers	to	further	their	goals.	The	
assumption	for	this	variable	is	that	not	all	groups	need	or	are	willing	to	use	suicide	
bombers	in	their	attacks	and	will	help	specify	certain	groups.	Suicide	bombers	would	be	
primarily	used	in	pursuit	of	the	goals	of	intimidation	where	the	groups	signal	that	they	are	
absolutely	committed	to	the	cause.	Additionally,	suicide	bombers	would	be	most	likely	
used	to	outbid	opponents	and	to	provoke	extreme	counter	terror	retaliations.	
3.2.2.	Dependent	Variable		
The	dependent	variable	for	this	study	is	the	categorical	variable	for	the	group	name.	
This	represents	the	official	name	of	the	group	as	recorded	in	the	GTD.	Additionally,	the	GTD	
dataset	was	further	cleaned	to	remove	events	from	the	dataset	that	included	generic	group	
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names	that	were	not	indicative	of	a	professional	group.	Examples	of	coded	group	names	
whose	events	were	removed	from	the	dataset	are	youths,	militants,	and	Mob.		
3.3.	Exploratory	Analysis		
In	this	section,	I	present	exploratory	analyses	of	the	dataset.	The	purpose	of	the	
section	is	to	see	how	the	known	data	and	unknown	data	resemble	each	other	to	show	that	
the	distributions	of	the	training	dataset	is	appropriate	to	apply	to	the	unknown	test	sets.	In	
this	section,	known	data	means	the	attacks	that	we	know	the	perpetrator	and	unknown	
data	means	the	attacks	that	we	do	not	know	the	perpetrator.		
	
	
Figure	3.5.	Attack	Types	
Figure	3.5	shows	the	attack	types	of	known	and	unknown	attacks.	The	left	
represents	the	known	data	and	the	right	represents	the	unknown	data.	These	two	graphs	
resemble	each	other;	both	have	a	big	number	of	Bombing/Explosion	attacks	followed	by	
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Armed	Assault	and	Assassination.	Facility/Infrastructure	Attack,	Hijacking,	Hostage	Taking,	
Unarmed	Assault,	and	Unknown	have	a	relatively	low	frequency.	
	
Figure	3.6.	Number	of	Kills	
Figure	3.6	shows	the	number	of	kills	by	known	and	unknown	attacks.	The	dotted	
line	represents	the	known	attacks,	and	the	solid	line	represents	the	unknown	attacks.	As	
we	can	see,	the	two	lines	almost	overlap	each	other	which	means	the	training	of	known	
data	can	be	appropriately	applied	to	unknown	data.	
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Figure	3.7.	Locations	of	Attacks	
Figure	3.7	represents	the	map	of	Pakistan	with	the	places	where	attacks	have	
happened.	The	left	map	shows	the	known	data	and	the	right	map	shows	the	unknown	data.	
Though	there	are	a	lot	more	attacks	represented	in	the	unknown	data,	the	regions	where	
the	attacks	happen	are	similar.	Therefore,	the	training	on	the	known	data	will	not	be	
misleading	to	use	to	test	the	unknown	data.	
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Figure	3.8.	Presence	of	Suicide	Attacks	
Figure	3.8	shows	the	frequency	of	suicide	attacks	when	terrorist	groups	commit	
attacks.	Even	though	the	number	of	suicide	attacks	are	more	than	three	times	higher	in	the	
unknown	attacks,	the	frequency	of	suicide	attacks	and	the	patterns	of	the	suicide	attacks	
are	similar	in	both	known	and	unknown	datasets.	Therefore,	the	known	and	unknown	
datasets	resemble	each	other.	
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Figure	3.9.	and	3.10.		show	the	target	type	of	unknown	and	known	datasets.	Target	
types	represent	the	locations	where	the	attacks	happen.	Both	known	and	unknown	data	
have	high	frequencies	of	attacks	against	police	and	private	citizens	and	properties.	The	
known	data	also	has	a	high	frequency	in	attacks	against	military.	Therefore,	both	known	
data	and	unknown	data	represent	similar	types	of	targets.		
3.4.	Processing	Data	and	Creating	the	Model		
	 Then	the	data	is	split	into	two	sets:	One	where	the	attack	has	been	attributed	(has	a	
group	name	value),	and	a	second	where	the	group	name	variable	is	Unknown.	This	results	
in	a	set	of	attributed	attacks	of	3,204	observations	and	unknown	attacks	of	10,891	
observations.		
Figure	3.9.	Target	Type	(Unknown	Data)	
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	 The	attributed	dataset	is	then	split	into	two	different	datasets	using	a	70/30	ratio	
with	the	new	datasets	being	the	training	set	having	70	percent,	and	the	test	set	having	30	
percent	of	the	observations.	After	splitting,	the	independent	variables	are	then	scaled	to	
make	the	learning	easier	for	the	machine.	Additionally,	the	categorical	variable	for	the	
group	name	is	turned	into	a	numeric	value	and	is	then	one	hot	encoded	into	a	large	matrix	
of	binary	columns.	For	example,	a	three-value	dataset	of	‘TTP’,	‘MQM’,	and	‘BLA’	will	be	
given	the	numbers	1,	2,	and	3.	Then,	columns	in	the	dataset	are	generated	to	represent	the	
binary	categories	of	‘isTTP’,	‘isMQM’	and	‘isBLA’	with	a	1	representing	true	and	0	false.	
	 The	model	is	then	initialized	as	a	sequential	model.	First,	an	8-node	input	layer	is	
added	using	the	rectifier	activation	function.	Two	hidden	layers	are	then	added	with	45	
nodes	each	also	using	the	rectifier	activation	function.	The	model	then	has	a	final	output	
Figure	3.10.	Target	Type	(Known	Data)	
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layer	with	95	nodes	using	a	softmax	activation	function.	Next,	the	model	is	compiled	using	
a	loss	function	of	categorical	cross	entropy,	the	adam	optimizer,	and	keeping	a	metric	of	
accuracy.	
The	model	is	then	fit	using	the	training	data	and	runs	for	50	epochs	with	a	batch	size	
of	75.	An	epoch	represents	when	every	row	in	the	dataset	has	been	input	into	the	network.	
The	batch	size	represents	the	number	of	rows	of	data	that	are	processed	before	the	weights	
of	the	nodes	are	updated.	The	training	dataset	uses	a	validation	split	of	.2	which	represents	
20	percent	of	the	data	are	held	back	from	the	training	data	to	be	used	in	a	validation	test	of	
the	model.	The	ratio	of	training	and	test	sets	are	typical.		
	 Once	the	model	has	finished	fitting.	The	loss	and	accuracy	values	are	determined	for	
both	the	training	set	and	the	validation	set.	Analyzing	these	numbers	allows	the	
determination	of	whether	the	model	is	acceptable	or	not.	When	the	model	is	acceptable	it	is	
then	fit	on	the	remaining	test	set	of	data	to	get	a	measure	of	overall	accuracy.	Finally,	the	
model	is	then	used	to	make	predictions	on	the	completely	unknown	dataset	where	the	
network	will	assign	a	value	to	the	likelihood	of	each	dependent	variable	being	correct	for	
each	row.	The	group	name	with	the	highest	value	will	be	the	selected	output	for	the	given	
attacks.	
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CHAPTER	4	
ANALYSIS	AND	CONCLUSION	
	 This	chapter	will	conduct	an	analysis	of	the	training	of	the	model	followed	by	an	
overall	conclusion	and	highlight	areas	of	improvement	in	the	future.	Figure	4.1	shows	the	
results	from	running	the	test	and	validation	sets.		
	
	
Figure	4.1.	Top:	Loss	Score	er	Epoch;	Bottom:	Accuracy	per	Epoch	
	 The	results	of	the	model	training	show	a	final	loss	value	of	1.2033	and	a	validation	
loss	of	1.617.	The	accuracy	of	the	model	is	indicated	as	65%	and	a	validation	accuracy	of	
61%.		The	closeness	of	the	accuracy	and	validation	accuracy	over	time	indicate	slight	over	
fitting.	Similarly,	the	validation	plots	stay	relatively	tight	throughout	the	epoch	with	a	slight	
exception	towards	the	end	of	training.		
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	 Moving	forward,	future	models	can	be	improved	by	making	a	number	of	
adjustments.	First,	the	independent	variables	can	be	expanded	from	their	current	values	to	
a	deeper	more	nuanced	version	of	the	same	variables	according	to	the	GTD.	This	has	the	
possibility	to	increase	variation	between	the	attack	type,	weapon	type,	and	target	type	
variables	between	attacks	resulting	in	potentially	greater	distinction	between	groups.	
Additionally,	secondary	and	tertiary	variables	could	be	used	for	the	attack,	weapon,	and	
target	types.	For	example,	using	targtype2	or	targtype3	for	secondary	and	tertiary	targets	
respectively.	Lastly,	adjustments	could	possibly	be	made	to	the	compilation	of	the	model.	
For	example,	the	parameters	of	the	model	such	as	batch	size,	hidden	layer	depth,	hidden	
layer	width,	and	weight	initialization	can	be	adjusted	to	facilitate	the	gradual	learning	of	
the	model	over	a	longer	period	of	time	to	prevent	overfitting	the	training	data.	The	impact	
of	these	suggestions	should	increase	the	overall	accuracy	of	the	model	so	that	it	can	then	be	
applied	to	unknown	data	with	a	greater	degree	of	confidence.		
	 To	conclude,	while	the	results	of	this	neural	network	model	achieved	a	65%	
accuracy	rate	after	being	trained,	I	believe	it	can	be	improved	on.	Achieving	results	better	
than	random	chance	indicates	that	the	artificial	neural	networks	can	be	used	as	a	predictor	
of	unattributed	attacks.	However,	the	success	of	the	method	is	highly	dependent	on	the	
model	and	the	amount	of	data	available.	As	such,	this	methodology	may	work	better	in	
areas	of	the	world	with	higher	numbers	of	attacks	and	lower	numbers	of	groups.	Equally	
plausible	is	that	the	methodology	would	likely	perform	worse	in	areas	where	there	is	little	
data	to	train	a	model	with.	
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4.1.	Limitations	and	Policy	Implications	of	the	Analysis	
	
The	major	limitations	of	this	study	are	the	fact	that	the	artificial	neural	networks	
can	only	predict	and	we	cannot	be	100%	sure	about	the	predicted	results.	As	the	accuracy	
of	the	model	gets	higher,	the	probability	of	the	machine	predicting	the	correct	perpetrator	
will	also	increase,	but	it	will	still	remain	as	a	“prediction”	rather	than	“the	answer.”	Another	
limitation	related	to	this	is	the	cases	of	lone	wolf	attacks,	one-hit-wanders,	ghost	groups,	
and	imitation	groups.	It	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	predict	with	this	model	whether	the	
perpetrators	were	one-time	action-oriented	groups	like	lone	wolf	attacks	and	one-hit-
wanders.	Or,	if	the	perpetrator	groups	were	imitating	certain	famous	and	well-known	
groups	in	their	attack	strategies,	group	behaviors,	and	others	distinct	characteristics,	then	
the	machine	will	make	a	prediction	of	the	original	group	that	had	more	presence	in	
terrorism	history.		
This	study	can	be	used	by	any	governments	and	groups	that	work	for	
counterterrorism.	In	this	thesis,	I	show	that	machine	learning	can	be	used	predict	the	
perpetrators	of	unclaimed,	unattributed	terrorist	attacks.	The	accuracy	of	model	is	still	
relatively	low	and	will	not	be	practical	to	be	used	yet,	however,	the	accuracy	is	higher	than	
random	guessing.	Therefore,	with	modification	of	the	model	and	improvement	in	data	
collection,	machine	learning	mechanism	can	be	used	to	predict	the	perpetrators	of	
unknown	attacks	in	the	future.		
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